famous of which is the covering-law account (Hempel 1965) . According to the covering-law account, a pheno menon is explained and predicted by subsuming it under general laws, thereby showing that the phenomenon occurred in accordance with or follows from the operation those laws. To explain a phenomenon is therefore to show how the phenomenon would have been expected to happen had we taken into account the laws that cover its occurrence. In this sense, laws are indispensable for scientific explanations and predictions.
Both the validity of Hempel's covering-law account and its applicability to the biological sciences have been questioned. There are many counterexamples to and difficulties with this account, and it is far from a settled issue whether biology has laws of its own (Raerinne 2011a) . Moreover, I have argued against views that regard allometries and scaling relationships as representing laws (Raerinne 2011b) . Although allometries and scaling relationships appear to apply to many taxa, they are neither universal nor exceptionless. Nor are the constants in allometries and scaling relationships stable or universal in character; they vary in value across different taxa and background conditions. Finally, these relationships represent evolutionary contingent generalizations, which threatens their lawlike status.
If it is true that allometries and scaling relationships do not represent biological laws, the covering-law account cannot be used to explicate how and under what conditions I n allometries and scaling relationships, body size is used as an independent variable of different dependent variables representing anatomical, physiological, morphological, behavioral, social, life historical, ecological, or paleobiological traits of taxa. Peters (1983) discussed what body size relationships imply, for instance, about animals' locomotion and immigration, home ranges and sociality, behavior, and nutrient cycling and turnover. Many of these implications of body size, as they were presented by Peters, seem to be explanations of phenomena. However, Peters's aim was to argue that body size relationships represent scientifically legitimate theories that are predictively accurate and falsifiable, in contrast to many other ecological theories.
My focus is not on Peters's (1983 Peters's ( , 1991 general philosophical views, such as his adherence to the hypotheticodeductive falsificationism in ecology. Besides, an extensive critical discussion of these views already exists (Southwood 1980 , Quinn and Dunham 1983 , Shrader-Frechette 1990 , 1994 , Castle 2001 . Instead, I will focus on a specific methodological issue in Peters (1983) -namely, what different roles allometries and scaling relationships have in scientific explanations and predictions and how well allometries and scaling relationships are capable of functioning in these roles.
One of the goals of the philosophy of science is to investigate how scientific explanations are possible and what is required of such explanations. In the literature, these issues are discussed in accounts of scientific explanation, the most Articles allometries and scaling relationships function in giving explanations and making predictions, in contrast to what Peters (1983 Peters ( , 1991 suggested. That is, some other account is needed to salvage the putative explanatory and predictive roles of allometries and scaling relationships.
I proceed in the present article as follows. In the "Causes as differencemakers" section, I defend an alternative account of explanation, the interventionist account of causal explanation. According to this account, explanatory generalizations should remain invariant during their interventions rather than being lawlike. In the "Allometries and scaling relationships" section, I apply the interventionist account to allo metries and scaling relationships. I argue that allometries and scaling relationships often function successfully heuristically rather than in making accurate and reliable predictions or giving illuminating explanations of phenomena.
Several authors have provided explanations for allometries and scaling relationships and especially for the constancy of their scaling exponents (Peters 1983 , West et al. 1997 , 1999 , Anderson-Teixeira et al. 2009 , Glazier 2010 ) rather than addressing the explanatory status of allometries and scaling relationships. The explanatory status of allometries and scaling relationships is largely independent of the issue of whether we can explain allometries and scaling relationships or the (putative) constancy of their scaling exponents. Moreover, I focus on the explanatory status of allometries and scaling relationships, because this issue has remained unaddressed. Or, at least, there should be more encompassing discussion on different kinds of roles of allometries and scaling relationships in the context of scientific explanation rather than on only a few negative aspects of these relationships (Stump and Porter 2012) . Finally, researchers, such as Peters (1983) , have sometimes relied on indefinite or inapplicable ideas when deciding by what criteria the explanatory status of allometries and scaling relationships should be evaluated.
To avoid cumbersome terminology, I sometimes use the terms regularities, relationships, and generalizations interchangeably. Strictly speaking, this is inaccurate: Generalizations are statements or expressions of regularities and relationships that are objective uniformities in nature. Explanations are descriptions of dependency relationships, and explanations are frequently given in terms of generalizations. Explanations are explanatory and true if the explanations correctly describe dependency relationships in nature.
Causes as differencemakers
According to the interventionist account of causal explanation, explanatory generalizations should remain invariant during their interventions (Woodward 2000 (Woodward , 2001 (Woodward , 2003a (Woodward , 2003b cf. Raerinne 2011c) . Invariant generalizations describe causal dependency relationships that can be used to manipulate things. In the interventionist account, causes are differencemakers. One should understand causes and effects as (i.e., they are representable as) variables. Many vernacular causal locutions can be understood to be about binary variables. Causes are differencemakers in that they can be intervened on to manipulate or control their effects. A change in the value of a cause makes a difference in the value of its effect. This formulation extends to indeterministic contexts, such that causes make a difference in the probability distribution of effects-for example, when a drug makes a difference in the probability of the recovery of a patient.
An invariant generalization describes what would happen to the value of a variable of a generalization if a value of one or more of its other variables were changed by an intervention or manipulation:
The underlying idea of my account of causal explanation [is that] we are in a position to explain when we have information that is relevant to manipulating, controlling, or changing nature, in an "in principle" manner of manipulation.… We have at least the beginnings of an explanation when we have identified factors or conditions such that manipulations or changes in those factors or conditions will produce changes in the outcome being explained. Descriptive knowledge, by contrast, is knowledge that, although it may provide a basis for prediction, classification, or more or less unified representation or systematization, does not provide information potentially relevant to manipulation.
Woodward 2003b, pp. 9-10
The stability of a generalization under interventions in its variables is what matters in explanations. For variable X to be explanatory with regard to variable Y, an invariant relationship or connection between the two is required in which interventions of the value of variable X change the value (or the probability distribution) of variable Y in accordance with the relationship between the two variables: If the value of the variable X of a generalization Y i = f(X i ) were changed by an intervention from x 1 to x 2 , the value of the variable Y would be changed from y 1 to y 2 in accordance with the relationship Y i = f(X i ). An intervention is a manipulation affecting the value of Y by changing the value of X. It should not affect Y via a route failing to go through X. Nor should the intervention be correlated with the other causes of Y, except for those intermediate causes of Y-if there are such-that are between X and Y. As long as a process has the properties described above, it is an intervention, regardless of whether it is based on the agency or activities of humans. For instance, there are so-called natural experiments, in which the interventions are not anthropogenic but are those of nature.
In order for there to be an intervention and a possibility of a manipulation, at least some of the terms of a generalization are required to be representable as variables. If there is no well-defined notion or idea of what it would mean to change a value or values of a term or multiple terms of a generalization or what it means to represent its terms as variables, the generalization is non-change-relating. Consider a Articles area and species diversity (cf. Simberloff 1974) . According to a rule of thumb, the manipulation of an area of an island or habitat that increases that area tenfold doubles the species diversity. The explanatory status of the species-area rule does not depend on there being a generalization that is universally true that holds in many or most background con ditions and that has no exceptions. In other words, it does not depend on the putative lawlike status of this rule, as some authors believe (Lange 2005) . Rather, it depends on whether the rule is invariant during its interventions.
The interventionist account has many advantageous features. It acknowledges that instead of laws, biologists are in the business of explaining phenomena by discovering the underlying causes and mechanisms of those phenomena. The interventionist account, moreover, further explicates under what conditions causal and mechanistic explanations are explanatory (Raerinne 2011c) , in contrast to some other mechanistic accounts that lack normative and explicative force (Machamer et al. 2000 , Pâslaru 2009 ). The interventionist account seems to accord well with the intuitions and practices of many biologists concerning explanation and experimentation, as well (cf. Lehman 1986 , Hairston 1989 , Glazier 2005 .
The interventionist account is a realist account of explanation. Although explanations can be reconstructed as arguments, explanations are not explanatory as a result of their argumentative structure as they are, for instance, in the covering-law account. Rather, explanations are descriptions of objective causal dependency relationships between things. Explanations are explanatory and true if they correctly describe causal dependency relationships. What has just been said implies that an explanation or a prediction cannot be charged with being insufficient on the basis that it lacks an argumentative structure, such as not being based on a deductive argument with universal laws, as Popperian ecologists (Peters 1983 , Murray 2000 , who adhere to the strict hypotheticodeductive scientific method and the covering-law account of explanation, argue.
The account resolves the problems of explanatory irrelevance and asymmetry, which have plagued previous accounts of scientific explanation, such as the covering-law account. The account allows us to speak of absences and omissions as causes and of preventions as effects, in contrast to some other accounts of scientific explanations, which is fortunate, because such "negative facts" are treated as causes and effects in the biological sciences. For a variable to count as an indeterministic cause, it is not required that it raise (or lower) the probability of the occurrence of its effect in every background condition, only that the variable should do this under some of the interventions in some background conditions. This last feature is especially fortunate, since many biological generalizations seem to lack stable probabilities, and many biological causes are evidently not unanimous in their effects.
The interventionist account therefore gives normatively correct answers to many issues about explanations. It would generalization that is sometimes presented as a chemical law: Noble gases are chemically inert. This generalization is nonchange-relating and consequently not invariant, because it does not allow for a well-defined change in its terms, noble gases and chemically inert. In fact, the generalization denies changes in the properties of noble gases that could be used in the manipulation of their properties. The explanation of chemical inertness of noble gases is that these gases have their outermost electron shell filled, and consequently, they cannot form bonds with other elements.
Generalizations describing static, qualitative, or categorical relationships can often be viewed as non-change-relating. Taxonomy is riddled with examples of non-change-relating generalizations, such as that members of the class Asteroidea may reproduce either sexually or asexually and that lichens are symbiotic composite organisms between a fungus species and a species capable of photosynthesis. As the examples just presented show, non-change-relating is not a pejorative label, but it can refer to legitimate nonexplanatory but classificatory or descriptive generalizations.
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a generalization to count as explanatory and invariant is that it expresses a change-relating generalization. A change-relating generalization describes how changes in the value of its variable or variables are related to the changes in the value of other its variables. Change-relating generalizations typically describe dynamic or active relationships between things.
Invariance is a degree property of generalizations with a threshold. There are non-change-relating generalizations that are not invariant. Likewise, there are change-relating generalizations, such as correlations between factors that are joint effects of a common cause (i.e., confounding factors), which are not invariant. An example is the correlation between readings on a barometer and the occurrence of storms that correlate because of their common cause-the changes in atmospheric pressure. Joint effects of common causes express change-relating generalizations that fail to be invariant during interventions. Only interventions in the value of a common cause variable make a difference to the values of the correlated joint effects.
Above the threshold of invariance, there are more or less invariant generalizations. Woodward (2003b) called the invariance domain the set or range of changes over which a generalization is invariant. This range need not be universal in the sense that during all the interventions on its variables, a generalization holds. A generalization remains invariant and explanatory even if during some interventions, it breaks down. Typically, generalizations fail to be invariant under extreme values of their variables or under some background conditions.
According to the species-area rule, the number of species (on an island) varies with the area (of that island); this relationship can be presented as a power equation, S = cA z , in which S is the number of species of a given taxonomic group, A is the area (of the island), and c and z are constants. There appears to be an invariant relationship between the variables Articles be interesting, therefore, to investigate what the account implies about the explanatory status of allometries and scaling relationships or whether the account fits with the ways in which researchers use allometries and scaling relationships.
Allometries and scaling relationships
The interventionist account gives experimentation a central place in establishing and testing explanatory generalizations. Nevertheless, some biologists use nonmanipulative or nonexperimental methods, such as regression equations and other correlations, to study phenomena.
Allometries and scaling relationships can be represented as regression equations or power equations, in which one variable changes as a power of another, such as
where Y is the dependent variable or response, W represents the independent or "explanatory" variable, a is the normalization constant, and b is the scaling exponent. In allometries and scaling relationships, body size or weight is treated as an independent variable of different anatomical, physiological, morphological, behavioral, social, life historical, ecological, and paleobiological dependent variables. Depending on the value of their scaling exponents, allometries and scaling relationships are called either allometric There are many biological traits that correlate with body size, W, and that can be represented as dependent variables, Y (Newell 1949 , Rensch 1960 , Gould 1966 , Jarman 1974 , Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1977 , 1983 , Peters 1983 , McKinney 1990 , Brown 1995 , Marquet 2000 , Marquet et al. 2005 . Some of the more common traits are fasting endurance scales as aW ; the number of animals of a given species declines with its body size, aW -1 ; according to Kleiber's rule, basal metabolism, an estimate of the energy required by an individual for the basic processes of living, varies as aW 0.75 ; heart rate varies as aW -0.25 ; and, in mammals, sociality and group behavior increase with body size.
Even though we know that correlation is not intimately or necessarily connected to causation or explanation, in practical terms, this dictum is sometimes forgotten in the literature on allometries and scaling relationships ( Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1983, pp. 632, 635, 642, 644; Peters 1983, pp. 135, 138; Peters and Raelson 1984, pp. 499, 504; Damuth 1991, p. 268; Brown 1995, pp. 95, 106, 119) . In this literature, body size as an independent variable is claimed to explain (a major) part of the variation in the dependent variable. How much it explains is dependent on the indices of fit-for example, on the value of r 2 . According to the interventionist account, however, correlations, by themselves, are not explanatory, regardless of how strong the connection between the correlating factors is. For a correlation to be explanatory, there has to be an intervention during which the relationship between factors remains invariant.
Below are reasons to be suspicious of the explanatory and causal relevance of some allometries and scaling relationships. There are other issues with these body size relationships that I will not take up here. I do not discuss the statistical problems, the problems of fitting data to regressions, or the choice of methods for estimating the parameters that are relevant in interpreting allometries and scaling relationships and that affect their reliability (Gould 1966 , Peters 1983 , McKinney 1990 , Kaitaniemi 2003 . Nor do I discuss the adaptive significance of allometries and scaling relationships (Rensch 1960 , Bonner 1968 , Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1983 .
If a generalization cannot be tested for how it might behave during interventions in or manipulations of its variables, the claims made about its explanatory status should be treated with suspicion. Testing whether allometries and scaling relationships represent invariant generalizations is sometimes difficult purely for scale-related reasons (cf. large ecosystems studies and paleobiological allometries and scaling relationships) and owing to many ethical, technical, and conceptual (see below) reasons.
In some cases, body size is used as an independent variable for the sake of convenience. Body size is relatively easy to quantify, compare, and estimate from fossil parts and other field samples. In other words, body size is sometimes a proxy for or a correlate of other features that are not so easy to quantify, compare, or estimate and that represent the real causes (see box 1).
Sometimes, the dependent variable in allometries and scaling relationships is such that it is difficult to understand what it means to change its value or what its different values would be. In other words, the problem is how dependent variables are to be represented as variables that have well-defined values. Consider the two regressions presented above that relate body size to sociality and group behavior. These generalizations are possibly non-change-relating, because what is meant by sociality or group behavior as variables is not well defined (see box 2). If this is true, it follows that it is unclear how changes in the value of an independent variable affect the dependent variables, simply because the dependent variables are not well defined as variables. What has been said about dependent variables applies to independent variables, as well. Body size is sometimes used as a proxy because the Articles real causes are not well defined or well definable as variables. Allometries and scaling relationships with ill-defined variables are non-change-relating and nonexplanatory as generalizations. The point here applies even if "explaining" is understood in the noncausal or statistical sense-that is, that the independent variable explains (a major) part of the variation in the dependent variable.
When the problems above can be avoided, it is likely that many allometries and scaling relationships presented in the literature turn out to be change-relating but noninvariant during interventions. Putative examples include the relationship between the number of animals of a given species and body size and the relationship between the home range of birds and mammals and body size. Therefore, even though many allometries and scaling relationships represent change-relating generalizations rather than non-change-relating generalizations with ill-defined or conflation variables, it is quite possible that they might be joint correlation effects, because of their common causes or certain background conditions-that is, cases of spurious causation. Finally, even if we find that some of these generalizations are change-relating and invariant, allometries and scaling relationships seem to offer rather superficial explanations that need to be supplemented with information about the mechanisms that underlie them. An example is Kleiber's rule. There seems to be an invariant and causal relationship between body size and basal metabolic rate that scales as aW 0.75 in many taxa, even though the underlying mechanism or mechanisms behind the rule are unknown or debated (Glazier 2005) .
Box 1. Proxy variables.
In antelope species, body size is positively correlated with group size, and the two variables covary from small, almost solitary antelope species, such as the species in the genus Cephalophus, to large herding species, such as Oryx beisa (Jarman 1974) . A qualitatively similar correlation between body size and group size has been found in primates, as well (Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1977) . In the regression for antelope species, however, body size is a proxy for or a correlate of other variables, such as the available food supply in the home range of these species or the level of threat from predation. The latter two, rather than body size, seem to represent the true causes or explanatory factors for differences in group sizes among antelope species (Jarman 1974) . Body size is therefore used as an independent variable for convenience: It is more easily quantifiable and measurable than the putative true causes of the phenomenon. For instance, species' home ranges can be notoriously difficult to estimate, let alone to measure.
Presenting a proxy as a cause is not only inaccurate and false but is also misleading insofar as we are searching for ways to control and understand nature. Of course, the use of proxies is unobjectionable if the authors acknowledge this and do not present proxies as explanatory factors, as, for instance, Jarman (1974) did. However, proxies are sometimes used because the true causes or effects are not easily definable as variables, in which case, they can be used to hide the fact that the allometries and scaling relationships in question are non-change-relating as generalizations. An example could be Jarman's variable level of threat from predation, which might represent a conflation variable (box 2).
Box 2. Conflation variables: Comparing apples and oranges.
In antelope species, body size and antipredator behavior correlate (Jarman 1974) . In general, the larger the antelope species, the more prepared the species is to defend itself; likewise, the larger the species, the more inclined it is to combine with others for mutual defense against predators. The problem is that antipredator behavior as a variable includes as its different values a heterogeneous collection of actions, behaviors, and social forms, which seem to lack common currency that would allow the different values to be compared. For instance, avoidance of detection, flight under detection, aggregation and other specialized forms of group formation, different kinds of alarm responses, avoidance of water holes or certain vegetation types, and escaping predators all count as different instances or values of antipredator behavior. Even such a specific behavior as avoidance of detection is actually a heterogeneous collection of different kinds of behaviors, such as feeding under cover, being nocturnal, and freezing in the presence of predators, that are difficult to evaluate and compare. That is, antipredator behavior seems to be a conflation variable.
In antelope species, body size and social organization are related to each other (Jarman 1974) . Social organization of antelope species first and foremost involves their territorial behavior. Territorial behavior seems to be another conflation variable without well-defined or comparable values, because it, too, includes different kinds of behaviors and activities as its different values, which seem to lack comparability, such as scent markings of a territory, visual or vocal displays of territoriality, and direct aggression or defense of a territory. Consequently, judgments that an antelope species is more (or less) social than another species because the species uses visual displays and scent markings to mark its territory, whereas another species defends its territory by aggressive behavior, are possibly subjective judgments on the part of the scientists rather than judgments based on comparable and plottable data that have some quality in common. No wonder, then, that such studies produce only semiquantitative or qualitative data and results.
The problem is not that social and behavioral allometries and scaling relationship studies make use of gross-or macrolevel variables, such as sociality or group behavior (Peters 1983 ) but, rather, that the variables are conflations of items that have little in common. That is, these studies use variables that are represented by units in many dimensions-dimensions that are possibly incommensurable as well. The charge of comparing apples and oranges is not intended as a criticism of social and behavioral variables, however. The charge is generalizable to other variables, and there are social and behavior allometry and scaling relationship studies using well-defined variables (e.g., Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1977).
Articles aW
0.66 rather than as aW 0.75 , it cannot be used to explain the constancy of the scaling exponents of other allometries and scaling relationships, because current explanations are based on the premise that the rule scales as aW 0.75 . This argument shows why the explanatory status of allometries and scaling relationships is independent of the explanations for these relationships. The two explanations are different as explanations, and they have different objects of explanations, as well.
Another role of allometries and scaling relationships is using body size as a predictive tool. It is trivial that mere correlations or change-relating but noninvariant generalizations can be used to make predictions. In other words, a causal or explanatory interpretation of allometries and scaling relationships is not a necessary condition for their functioning in making predictions. I have nothing against the idea that allometries and scaling relationships function in making predictions. At the same time, this role should be adopted with some qualifications.
Body size as an independent variable typically "explains" only part of the variation in the dependent variable of allometries and scaling relationships. The presence of this residual variation around the regression lines shows that for successful and accurate predictions, other independent variables are needed in addition to body size. In other words, it is sometimes not true that allometries and scaling relationships can be used in making successful or accurate predictions. Furthermore, although mere correlations can be used in making predictions, it is not true that all the predictions are equally good, reliable, or illuminating. Mere correlations represent accidents that hold because of common causes or certain background conditions. Predictions based on invariant generalizations are more than accidents, because there exists a causal relationship or connection between the variables, and invariant generalizations often lead to more reliable or projectable predictions, because there are typically back-up causes and mechanisms in biology capable of producing some effect if some other cause or mechanism failed to operate under some conditions. In other words, mere correlations could provide bases for fragile and unrealiable predictions; greater confidence than is warranted is sometimes given to using body size as a reliable and accurate predictive tool (see figure 1) .
The third role of allometries and scaling relationships is that these relationships should be understood as elucidating phenomena from data; that is, they are used to discover, describe, and classify phenomena to be explained, or patterns, rather than things that do the explaining. In other words, many allometries and scaling relationships serve a heuristic role by suggesting new hypotheses and phenomena to be explained and by helping to discover regular connections between body size and other biological variables. For instance, homeotherms, poikilotherms, and unicellular organisms have different a values in the equations that relate their metabolic rates to their body size. In the equation for a basal metabolic rate (Kleiber's rule), which scales with Marquet and colleagues (2005) seem to have had something similar in mind in the following passage:
The ubiquity and simplicity of scaling relationships and power laws in ecological systems might be deceptive when compared with the complexity of the systems that they attempt to describe. Unless their theoretical foundations and underlying mechanisms are worked out to a sufficient detail to be able to predict new, so far unknown, relationships, there is the danger for this field to become adrift in a sea of empiricism devoid of theory and with little explanatory power. Recent theoretical developments, such as the metabolic theory of ecology… hold great hope in this direction; however, there is still ample ground for synthesis and theory refinement. In particular, experimental approaches with either model organisms or simple ecosystems have been little explored in the context of scaling and power-law relationships and could prove to be particularly fruitful to gain a deeper understanding of their generating mechanisms and implications.
p. 1764
Describing an "underlying mechanism" is a complement to an invariant causal relationship, because it describes how the relationship produces its phenomenon by describing the mechanism within the system. A causal explanation complemented with mechanistic details provides us with possibilities of more precise interventions and information about the extrapolability of a causal relationship, because with mechanistic details, we obtain information about how the parts of a system are related to one another and under what conditions parts of the system fail to operate. In other words, a causal explanation complemented with information about its underlying mechanism provides us with better or more illuminating explanations than does an explanation omitting mechanistic details. (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski [2010] gave a more detailed account as to how mechanistic details affect the "goodness" of an explanation.)
A debated issue in the context of Kleiber's rule concerns the value of its scaling exponent. Some studies have suggested that the scaling exponent of the rule should be aW 0.66 rather than aW 0.75 (Glazier 2005) . This issue has different implications for the explanatory status of Kleiber's rule and explanations for allometries and scaling relationships. For the explanatory status of Kleiber's rule, it does not matter whether the scaling exponent is closer to 0.66 than to 0.75. Of course, the functional relationship between the variables in question if the exponent is 0.66 is different from that if it is 0.77, but the causal and explanatory relationship between the variables exists regardless of this difference. In many explanations for allometries and scaling relationships, Kleiber's rule is used as a master equation, from which the constancy of scaling exponents of other body size relationships is derived. These explanations are noncausal, covering-law explanations. Now, if Kleiber's rule scales as Articles metabolic rate have well-defined values describing what would happen to the value of the latter variable had we changed the value of the former variable to such and such. Interestingly, as was argued at the end of the last section, Kleiber's rule has another role in the context of explanations, as well. Not only is Kleiber's rule capable of functioning as a thing that provides us with explanations, it also provides us with objects of explanations. Likewise, I did not argue that body size cannot be manipulated. Body size is manipulable by means of, for instance, direct resizing of (colonial) organisms and so-called allometric engineering (Sinervo and Huey 1990 , Frankino et al. 2005 , Glazier 2005 ). In fact, there are many studies focused on what effects the manipulation of body size may have on certain other traits of organisms Huey 1990, Sinervo et al. 1992) . Rather, the argument was that there are reasons to be suspicious of the explanatory status of some allometries and scaling relationships, such as that they include ill-defined or conflation variables, make use of proxies, display change-relating but noninvariant dynamics, or furnish us with comparatively superficial explanations of phenomena, because the mechanisms behind allometries and scaling relationships are unknown.
The use of proxies and other ill-defined variables is not an empirical issue only in the sense that we should expect the bad variables to be eliminated as more empirical studies are conducted. Proxies and other ill-defined variables are sometimes used when the independent or dependent variable cannot-for whatever reason-be exactly defined, operationalized, quantified, or measured as a variable that has a well-defined and comparable value. That is, the use of proxies and ill-defined variables is a problem prior to empirical testing. In fact, proxies and ill-defined variables can be used as devices to hide empirical and conceptual inadequacies in one's research.
There is no point in debating whether many of the causal or explanatory locutions given to body size referred to in the previous section are what the authors meant rather than lapses. However, there is a way to express the basic question of this article without causal or explanatory locutions. Why is body size-in contrast to some another variable-used as an independent variable in the literature on allometries and scaling relationships? That is, what justifies or explains the use of body size as an independent variable? There is a strong correlation between population density and body size across motile taxa, known as the inverse-scaling rule, where body size is used as an independent variable. However, there is a similar strong correlation for plants and other sessile organisms between the two variables, but, in this case, it is the density of populations that is treated as the independent variable. What explains or justifies this difference? The correlation itself does not explain the asymmetry in this case nor the asymmetry of using body size as an independent variable in allometries and scaling relationships in general; the variables simply covary.
It is easy to criticize the ideas presented above by suggesting that there is a mathematical or statistical sense of body size as aW 0.75 in these taxa, the values of a are 4.1, 0.14, and 0.018 for homeotherms, poikilotherms, and unicellular organisms, respectively (Peters 1983) . Rather than providing us with explanations, many allometries and scaling relationships represent interesting objects of explanation. Why is it that unicellular organisms have the lowest values of a in such equations? How and why do homeotherms metabolize at a higher level (and therefore seem to use and exhaust relatively more resources) than do poikilotherms and unicellular organisms of similar size? Does the claim that some allometries and scaling relationships represent phenomena to be explained rather than things that do the explaining cast a shadow over allometry and scaling relationship studies? No. A science or discipline without interesting phenomena to be explained lacks the potential to progress and mature. In this respect, these studies show great potential.
Conclusions
I have argued that allometries and scaling relationships often function successfully heuristically-that is, discovering or elucidating patterns from data rather than making accurate and reliable predictions or giving illuminating explanations of phenomena.
The aim was not to suggest that allometries and scaling relationships cannot be used in causal explanations of phenomena. For instance, Kleiber's rule seems to describe a causal dependency relationship, which can be represented as a causal generalization in which the variables body size and basal explanation according to which allometries and scaling laws are explanatory, regardless of their explanatory status in the context of causal explanations. I have nothing against the idea that there should be explanations that differ from causal explanations. Even though the interventionist account covers only causal explanation and even if the scope of this article is therefore limited, an important species of explanation is nevertheless discussed, because causal explanations allow controlling, understanding, and manipulating nature, in contrast to some noncausal forms of explanation.
